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How to begin an address to Liberty and Art? It may be useful to
propose three categories.  The first is that of liberty as an ethics, a
way of life or a social practice that situates the practice of art.  The
second is as a realm of representations of liberty within generic
categories of art such as monuments, sculptures and paintings; this
category includes works such as the Statue of Liberty and Delacroix’s
Liberty Leading the People (1831). The third category, which tends to
subsume the other two, is the vision of liberty as an aesthetic practice,
in which the autonomous sensibility of the artist finds its match in the
liberated apprehension of the spectator, in a world where free
expression can be produced and recognised.  Liberty then becomes the
name for a set of conditions for locating, apprehending and tasting the
sensibilities of freedom.  What I want to take up in this introduction to
today’s event is this issue of sensibility; how a particular flavour of
freedom (the flavour of freedom fries, perhaps) that is produced by a
certain distribution of the sensible, to borrow Jacques Rancière’si
phrase, defines a social and cultural horizon of liberty, as well as the
possibility for artistic critique, or assent.
The novelist Robert Musil wrote ‘History arises out of routine ideas, out
of indifference to ideas, so that reality comes primarily out of nothing
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being done for ideas.’ii The premise of today’s event is that something
might be done for the routine idea of liberty through the practice of
art.  In Britain, Liberty defined as the intimate link between free
association, free trade and free expression is an idea that has become
so routine that even the crises of liberty are part of that routine. For
an example of what I mean by this, and of how artists are commonly
included in descriptions of liberty, I’m going to quote a newspaper
opinion piece by the historian Timothy Garton Ash, published a
fortnight ago, which samples a current liberal consensus:
Fanatics without frontiers are on the march . . . In the first decade of
the 21st century, the spaces of free expression, even in old-established
liberal democracies. . will continue to be eroded.  Free expression is
not just the preserve of writers and artists.  It’s a first order freedom,
the oxygen on which other liberties depend.  Not for nothing did John
Stuart Mill devote a whole chapter in his ‘On Liberty’ to “The liberty of
thought and discussion.” The erosion of free expression comes in many
different ways . . . If you think we are not engaged in a struggle
against manifold enemies of freedom, as potentially deadly as those
we faced in the 1930s, you are living in a fool’s paradise.iii
Free expression, Garton Ash says, is not the preserve of writers and
artists; nor are they the cause of the crisis of liberty, because they are
part of its routine.  The idea of liberty is what sustains and enables
artistic practices, but these practices do not contribute to the evolution
or the development of the idea of liberty.  Maybe our current idea of
liberty, based on the equivalence and immanence of meaning and the
primacy of ‘feelings’, is so infinitely accommodating and culturally
elastic that it has no need to evolve. There is no image too extreme or
excessive, no meteorite-felled Pope by Maurizio Cattelan or painterly
representation of paedophilic sex (I’m referring here to the work of
Gerald Davis in the USA Today exhibition at the Royal Academyiv) that
can’t be included in the everyday operations of liberty that also
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guarantee my right to enter and leave this building, grow or shave off
a beard, or get on an aeroplane.  Garton Ash thinks that anyone who
doesn’t see the moral and practical equivalence between Jerry
Springer The Opera and their last trip abroad are missing the point.
He offers a model of liberty that is ahistorical, first-order and steady
state, a shared principle of social and cultural security that underwrites
our actions – the threat to liberty, he says, comes from those who feel
threatened by it, the fanatics without frontiers.  In Garton Ash’s view,
as for the British utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham, the term
liberty defines a space where threat or coercion does not exist.
I’d like to look at this another way, which may open up the question of
how the practice of art might do something for the idea of liberty.  If
liberty cannot be threatened by free expression, what is free
expression? How does free expression support and confirm the current
non-coercive, threat-free flavour of liberty? It is crucial to note that in
order to function in this way, free expression has to be aligned, not
with equality as such, but with the idea of equal distribution. In this
way, liberty guarantees, not the equal right to expression, but the
right to equal expression, that is affirmed in well-worn liberty routines
such as ‘everyone must have their say’ or ‘let’s have a debate’.  To
understand the implications for artistic practice of this difference
between equality as such and equal distribution, it is useful to pick up
on Garton Ash’s reference to John Stuart Mill, and Mill’s text On Liberty
of 1859v.  Garton Ash thinks that Mill was a prophet of the primacy of
free expression, as the foundation of all the other freedoms we enjoy.
I disagree; in On Liberty Mill made free expression into the function of
a system for the equal distribution of well-being and happiness, whose
ultimate goal was to establish the expectation of security and the
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abolition of threat. This is Mill’s Bicentenary year, and is an occasion to
address his version of liberty, in the context of neo-utilitarian models
of democracy, which have been applied to many social formations,
including arts policy and art practice. Mill’s model of liberty, which can
be summed up as ‘everyone to pursue their own good in their own
way, without harming others’ seems to offer a defence of individual
autonomy, creativity and the immanence of meaning, against irrational
prejudice and popular opinion.  This seems just and reasonable, but if
you read On Liberty alongside Mill’s other book, Utilitarianismvi, which
was written concurrently and published two years later in 1861, a
controlling definition and concept of liberty becomes apparent, that
determines the character of free expression. In Utilitarianism, Mill said
that the central principle of utility was that ‘equal amounts of
happiness are equally desirable’vii, an echo of Jeremy Bentham’s
dictum ‘an equal quantity of happiness for every one of them.’viii  Mill
stressed that this was not the same as saying that everybody has an
equal right to happiness.   Infringements of the Millian and Benthamite
brand of liberty do not occur because of the exhibition or publication of
offensive or obscene images, but because of the disturbance of the
principle of equal distribution.  To give an example – a journalist
recently went to visit two well-known British artists and said ‘I find the
ponciness of the language that surrounds the art world a bit
frustrating’ and ‘I don’t believe that a complicated word is necessarily
better than a simple one.’ix I think it’s important to point out that, in
saying this, the journalist was not claiming an equal right to the
happiness that can be gained by working at an understanding of art or
pursuing an entrée in to the art world, but was instead seeking the
artist’s agreement to the right to equal happiness, supported by a
sphere of communication in which art would be made available to
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everyone.  The response she got was to be ejected from the studio
with the words ‘What’s the point of trying to talk to someone who’s
always going to try and reduce it down to this kind of common
language . . . there is no common language in art, it’s a complex
activity. I get bored with this, I’m bored or this already, this
conversation.’  In this trivial exchange of dialogue, we already have
two versions of the relationship of liberty and art. In the first, the
activity and practices of the artist are part of the everyday liberty
routines of a participatory democracy and should therefore be
accommodated to them – an open society requires accessible and
comprehensible art made by co-operative artists who don’t fling the
gift of liberty back in our faces.  In the second version of the
relationship between liberty and art, the artist’s intervention suspends,
and thereby compromises, the common dispositions and sensibilities of
liberty. I will discuss this second version in a moment, with reference
to the work of Ian Hamilton Finlay, but I also want to point out that
the notion of the ‘accommodating artist’ isn’t just favoured by
wandering journalists; it has considerable academic, intellectual and
institutional support.  Professor John Skorupski, in his recent summary
of JS Mill’s thought Why Read Mill Today?x addresses the question of
liberty and art; in testing Mill’s ideas against contemporary
phenomena, Skorupski identifies a ‘crisis . . .  of ethical and aesthetic
self-identity . . .. the coarsening or diminution of ideals of the good’xi
that he thinks is manifest in much contemporary art.  He claims that
while scholarship and science continue to develop as an infrastructure
underpinning notions of rationality, current art fails to provide us with
models of a life worth living, offering instead inner exile, vacuous
gimmickry or fatuousness.
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The artist Ian Hamilton Finlay, who died in March 2006, was someone
who used ‘inner exile’ as a central element of his practice, and thereby
produced a robust response to Skorupski’s accusation.  Finlay engaged
with ‘the problem of liberty’ through the practice of art, and specifically
with the legacies of the French revolution and the utilitarian conversion
that followed it. His work also showed that to assume the position of
the subject of a discourse on liberty is to understand its current
problems, and its future tendencies, by means of an historical
reflection.  Finlay’s opposition of ‘Athens’ (Edinburgh) to his garden at
‘Little Sparta’ established a topography of liberty that allowed
languages, forms and histories of liberty and tyranny to cross-
reference each other, and replaced a simple opposition of liberty and
tyranny with a more complex understanding of how the forms of civic
and social liberty that have followed the French revolution have their
roots in forms of violence, overthrow, and the institution of new forms
of mastery of audiences and of the cultural and visual field.  His art
looked beyond the assumptions of ‘Liberty as Security’ to ask what it is
that liberty secures, disposes and appropriates.
 ‘The Little Spartan War’ of 1983, which was occasioned by Strathclyde
Region’s attempts to seize sculptures from Finlay’s garden at little
Sparta against unpaid taxes, pointed to a division within the public
sphere between the ‘Athenian’ liberty of Edinburgh, characterised by a
neo-utilitarian order, and the aesthetic practice of liberty that Finlay
developed at Little Sparta, which included references to the
iconography of St Just and Hitler’s SS alongside classical motifs.
The terms of engagement that Finlay used in Little Spartan War had
been anticipated by ‘The Third Reich Revisited’ an image/text piece
from 1982 that, as Finlay put it ‘was . . an attempt to raise . . .the
questions which our culture does not want to put in an idea form.’xii
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One of the questions that Finlay addressed in this work was directed at
the legacy of the utilitarian model of civic or social liberty promoted by
philosophers such as Jeremy Bentham and JS Mill, and was expressed
in the following way:
One of the enigmas of the 70s and 80s is the failure of a pluralist
democracy to produce a public art for itself. Where (except possibly in
the new sculpture parks) is there any public celebration of radical
secularism? Of ecological utilitarianism? Of caution-at-all-costs free
conformism? Of Benthamite pacifism?xiii
In October 2006, I think that Finlay’s rhetorical questions have been
answered, in a more precise and satisfying way than he could have
anticipated.  An apparently perfect reconciliation of the
liberal/utilitarian model of liberty and the practice of art can be
experienced in one quick slide down one of Carsten Höller’s chutes, a
definitive piece of mass choreography that has been installed in the
Turbine Hall at Tate Modernxiv. Two views on Höller have been put
about – either that he genuinely wants us all to have fun or that he is
cultivating a bit of satirical ambiguity.  I would say that neither of
these views are correct.  Höller, whose previous works include ‘Killing
Children’ – a child’s bicycle rigged up to a jerry can of petrol that
ignites when the child starts pedalling, is simply interested in finding
out how the spectator can, not just ‘interact’ with, but be made
responsible for, the social being of the artwork, in much the same way
that the artist is asked to do.  What the Turbine Hall piece offers us is
the even social distribution of happiness within the framework of
autonomous, individual experience. As you slide down one of Höller’s
chutes, you can be assured of your place in an aesthetic order where
everyone has an experience, yet no-one’s experience counts for more
than anyone else’s – in this way, your moral security is guaranteed as
well as your physical safety.  The famous ‘happiness principle’
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proposed by Jeremy Bentham in the nineteenth century, does not
indicate the maximisation of some abstract stock of social happiness,
but rather, as I have said ‘an equal quantity of happiness for every
one of them.’ This utilitarian principle was also enshrined in the United
Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, Article 27 (1).
Declaration 27(1) says:
“Everyone has the right . . . to enjoy the arts.’xv
Since the British Government was a signatory to the UN declaration,
they ought to be pleased with Carsten Höller’s achievements in the
Turbine Hall. However, while Article 27 (1) is aligned with the principle
of liberty as open access and equal distribution, it is important to point
out its historical amnesia, as it severs the link between modern forms
of liberty-as-security and the rhetoric of ‘liberty or death’ that
emerged in the French revolution.  In this regard, it can be noted that
nothing in Article 27(1) secures or protects my particular, personal or
pathological forms of enjoyment in relation to visual art or the arts in
general; in fact, such forms of enjoyment are placed under suspicion.
To quote one summary of Bentham’s position on particular interests:
‘the interests are not particular because they are sinister, they are
sinister because they are particular.’xvi This telling phrase indicates, I
think, why our current definitions of the ‘excess’ of free speech are so
imprecise, since they ignore the sinister nature of particularity itself,
and assume that the fail safe point of free speech is triggered by a
reference to some recognisably sinister or evil object from the store
cupboard of transgressive images. Anyone who has been following
recent debates on whether or not cultural and religious separation
presents a threat to liberty and participatory democracy will have
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noted that cultural and social evil is in fact said to reside in those ‘who
are sinister because they are particular’.  For Jeremy Bentham, the
American and French declarations of rights of the late eighteenth
century threatened the utilitarian model of liberty, in which the right to
equal enjoyment (the example Bentham gives is ‘it is right that I
should have such a thing done for me’) should always take precedence
over the kind of absolutist claims that typified the American and
French Declarations of Rights (the threat of sinister interests, Bentham
tells us, emerges in the phrase ‘I have a right to have such a thing
done for me’)xvii.   Article 27 (1) of United Nations’ Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, is something of an oddity in this
respect, since the phrase “Everyone has the right . . . to enjoy the
arts’ combines the utilitarian morality of ‘it is right that everyone
should enjoy the arts’ with the absolutism of ‘Everyone has a right . .
to enjoy the arts’.  This paradox is occasioned, I would suggest, by the
definitive victory, after World War Two, of a kind of politically inflected
embourgeoisment of culture, that served its particular interests by
opposing the principle of particular interest, and promoted
participatory democracy, initially of the ‘trickle down’ variety. Some
artists, like Carsten Höller, have found ways to make the legatees of
this cultural shift responsible for the forms of art that they have helped
to create.  Other artists have also found it necessary to produce critical
reflections on liberty, that address the impasse created by the clash
between ‘the equal right to happiness’ and ‘the right to equal
happiness.’
A brilliant allegory of the contemporary dilemmas of liberty and art is
to be found in the painting Where Happiness Happens, made by
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Geraint Evans, my colleague at Wimbledon College of Artxviii.  This
painting has been described in the following way:
A younger artist sits in his studio surrounded by his own attempts at
emulating his artistic heroes whose postcards adorn a wall. He hopes a
gallery dealer will ring, but knows they won’t.xix
Nonetheless, it is also possible to read this narrative of individual
failure as the story of a pyrrhic and perverse victory for the utilitarian
idea of happiness.  This artist shown in this painting exists within the
ideal of zero-threat and non-coercion promised by the utilitarian model
of liberty; he is not being coerced, nor is required to co-erce himself.
He is the still point of the still world of liberty, living in a social bubble
or diving bell, breathing an atmosphere of freedom where the pressure
is constantly intensified to ensure his security and survival.  Where
happiness happens; culture at a standstill.
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